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Beyond Memory Wars: The Indigènes de la République’s Grass-Roots 
Anti-Racism between the Memory of Colonialism and Antisemitism
Abstract
In the mid-2010s, the expression ‘memory wars’, which had been coined in debates about the 
role of different commemorations of France’s colonial history, became increasingly identified 
with an atmosphere of conflict between France’s Jewish population and other minority 
communities. Simultaneously, conflicts over remembrance of the Holocaust and France’s 
colonial past characterised a new dynamic of memorial anti-racism, which was often 
characterised by the organisation Les Indigènes de la République. By examining the 
trajectory of this association and its role in the gestation of a memorial conflict, this article 
provides a new understanding of memory debates ‘from below’. Through oral history 
interviews as well as the organisation’s publications and media appearances, this article 
outlines the role of memory in the growing atmosphere of conflict between Jews and other 
postcolonial minorities in France and ultimately questions the role of so-called memory wars 
in the growing conversation about race in the Fifth Republic.
Article
After the events of 2005, as a series of controversies brought the issue of ‘colonial memory’ 
to the forefront of the French public and political conversation, a new term was coined: 
‘guerres de mémoire’, or memory wars. It aimed to name and criticise a new development in 
which representatives of minority groups tried to assert the superiority of their community’s 
memory narrative against narratives of other communities. Benjamin Stora, the historian 
most responsible for the broad dissemination of this expression, was particularly baffled by 
this change. The historian-cum-activist had previously perceived his role as leading a battle to 
‘break the silence’ that surrounded France’s misdeeds in Algeria. Since the early 1990s, his 
writings and TV documentaries called on French society to confront the dark stains of its 
colonial past in order to ‘heal the gaping wounds’ that plagued it. Yet these so-called memory 
wars suggested that Stora’s paradigm, in which historians’ unearthing of painful memories 
inevitably led to social reconciliation, might have been slightly too optimistic. On the one 
hand, the prioritisation of memory did not solve problems of racism to create a peaceful 
society. On the other, these conflicts reflected the growth of memory activism, where anti-
racist activists harnessed the memory of colonialism for their own purposes and did not 
always respect historians’ expertise in the process. Furthermore, while the term ‘memory 
wars’ was supposed to pertain to inter-community strife between Maghrebi communities, 
African-heritage communities, harkis and pieds-noirs,1 the term came to be employed ever 
more often to describe how racialised minorities in France challenged what they perceived as 
a Republican ‘memory primacy’ of the Holocaust in France. 
This article examines this particular conflict, or the way memorial activism that focused on 
colonial history engaged with France’s Jewish community and antisemitism. It does so by 
exploring the trajectory of the Indigènes de la République, an organisation that was 
particularly identified with this kind of memorial anti-racism. Through oral history interviews 
as well as the organisation’s publications and media appearances, this article outlines the role 
of memory in the growing atmosphere of conflict between Jews and other postcolonial 
minorities in France and ultimately questions the role of so-called memory wars in the 
growing conversation about race in the Fifth Republic. Specifically, the Indigènes’ focus on 
its goal to represent the voice of France’s racialised (and colonised) minorities provides a 
scope for analysing the catch-all term ‘memory wars’ from below. This article therefore 
examines the organisation’s trajectory, which aimed to turn academic preoccupation with the 
subaltern into a tangible form of anti-racist activism, as a way of exploring grassroots actors’ 
motivations in mobilising the memory of colonialism in France. While the memory debate in 
France often focused on the failings of the republic to ‘come to terms’ with its colonial past, 
actors in this nascent debate, and particularly the Indigènes de la République, approached the 
republic as self-proclaimed representatives of voices ‘from below’ that claimed a legacy of 
colonial resistance. 
Furthermore, this article’s examination of so-called memory wars through the voices of their 
protagonists tries to provide a new angle to scholarship on the politicisation on memory. It 
urges to go beyond Michael Rothberg’s influential Multidirectional Memories, which 
contends that social memory conflicts can be overcome through a ‘positive’ cross-fertilisation 
of memory between different groups of victims.2 While this article examines the relationship 
between various memory groups, it also suggests Rothberg’s normative division between 
‘true multidirectionality’, which leads to greater social justice, and other kinds of ‘negative’ 
memory, is unhelpful in the examination of memory as a public, political process. The 
present article’s focus on the Indigènes’ position within a social conflict about memory aims, 
on the contrary, to address memory activism as one element in a changing political 
understanding of France as a postcolonial, multi-ethnic polity. 
Lastly, this article’s main preoccupation is with the role of activists ‘from below’ in initiating 
a conversation about race in the Fifth Republic, continuing earlier exploration of the role of 
memory vocabulary to bypass the republican barrier of supposed ‘colour blindness’ and 
thematise a hitherto ‘unrepublican’ notion of race.3 In so doing, it takes a novel approach to 
the study of memory conflicts through attention to the agency of one of its main actors. 
Rather than seeing conflicts inherent in memory debates as anomalies in a process that is 
aimed at national reconciliation,4 this piece demonstrates that they are a part of a 
contradictory and non-linear negotiation of race in 21st-century France.
First Intersections between Jewish Memory and the Memory of Colonialism
Initially, the movement to acknowledge France’s colonial history did not oppose the Jewish 
community’s struggle to recognise France’s responsibility for the fate of French Jews in the 
Holocaust.5 Rather, the Jewish success paved the way for greater attention to other groups’ 
narratives.6 Fighting for recognition of France’s Vichy past became, in some cases, a way for 
activists to explore other oppressions, as figures on the traditional French Left discovered the 
importance of ‘coming to terms’ with France’s colonial past through the activism of the 
1980s. This included figures like the journalist Anne Tristan, who began her political 
trajectory fighting the rise of the Front national and supporting ‘facing up to the crimes of 
Vichy’ in the 1980s.7 She later became an instrumental figure in the early 1990s by drawing 
attention to the importance of commemorating the massacre of Algerians in Paris on 17 
October 1961. Here in particular, the Papon Trial in 1998 was seen as the epitome of such 
links, as the prosecution used the public exposure of the trial to highlight Papon’s role in the 
deportation of Jewish children from the Gironde as well as in the brutal oppression of a 
peaceful Algerian demonstration in Paris in 1961.8 As a result, Maurice Papon became a 
living example of the continuity between Vichy and the Algerian War of Independence. 
Nonetheless, the story in which activists transitioned from protesting France’s role in the 
Second World War to demanding to break the silence on the excesses of decolonisation was 
largely limited to the traditional, white French Left. Activists who represented racialised 
communities did not actively participate in the Jewish struggle to commemorate the Shoah 
but were simultaneously inspired by Jewish success both on the level of discourse and in 
achieving tangible results. First, the focus on the state’s acknowledgement of the Jewish 
narrative produced a change of vocabulary, most notably the invention of the term devoir de 
mémoire, or ‘duty of memory’.9 This term entered the public conversation in the 1970s to 
designate the Republic’s responsibility towards the memory of its Jewish community, and as 
of 1992 it penetrated the country’s official political discourse. It demonstrated a new desire to 
include the memory of, in the words of Serge Barcellini, those ‘dead because of France’ into 
the national narrative.10 Second, by the end of the 1990s, Jewish struggles had resulted in a 
series of political achievements. These included the construction of memorials, the turn to the 
courts through the appropriation of the term ‘crime against humanity’ to prosecute old Vichy 
collaborators, Jacques Chirac’s speech of admission of the Republic’s responsibility for the 
fate of its Jews11 and lastly, the turn to legislation in the form of the Gayssot Law that singled 
out Holocaust denial as a crime.12 These achievements became markers of success for 
activists who represented other communities. They quickly appropriated these as a blueprint 
for minority communities to establish a voice within France’s Republican narrative.
The most notable case of such inspiration was the Antillean community’s struggle to 
politicise the memory of colonial slavery in France. The defining moment in this process was 
the mobilisation of the Antillean community in Paris to protest against the commemoration of 
the 150th abolition of slavery in 1998 and its programme that equated the birth of the 
Republic with white abolitionism. These protests were the fruit of the work of the association 
Bwafuyé, which was founded by the couple Serge and Viviane Romana, two former 
Guadeloupian indépendentists based in Paris. Their transition from activism aimed at 
independence from France to community organisation that prioritised the memory of slavery 
was inspired by the Jewish experience.13 In particular, the psychiatrist Viviane Romana 
emulated the work of Jewish colleagues who had explored the role of trauma in articulating 
identities for younger generations. Romana contended that Antilleans needed to follow the 
Jewish ‘blueprint’ of asserting painful memory to define their belonging in France. As a 
result, the new organisation’s goals focused on harnessing the history of slavery to reassess 
the historical bond between Antilleans and the Republic. 
Caribbean activism that aimed to commemorate colonial slavery quickly adopted the methods 
of Jewish activists. After the 1998 protests, Antillean politicians began a process that 
culminated in the ratification of the Taubira Law in 2001, which recognised Transatlantic 
Slavery as a crime against humanity and called on school curricula to give it ‘the place it 
deserves’.14 The legislative process demonstrated that Antillean activists and politicians were 
aware of Jewish activists’ actions, if not directly inspired by it. Most notably, the then newly 
elected Guyanese MP Christiane Taubira later admitted in an interview she had harnessed the 
concept of devoir de mémoire, which in that period was still mainly used to speak of the 
Holocaust, in debates about the law because she realised that it had won wide recognition and 
could be used to gain support for the commemoration of slavery. Taubira’s success was 
therefore based directly on the continued use of commemorational vocabulary, but it 
simultaneously embraced the legal vocabulary of ‘crime against humanity’ and made use of 
the Gayssot Law’s precedent of moral – and memorial – legislation. 
However, the overriding sense of memorial cross-community inspiration – if not cooperation 
– did not last. Quickly after the triumph of the Taubira Law, the juxtaposition of the emerging 
public attention to the memory of slavery and the now established – if recent – official 
embrace of the memory of the Holocaust became a new battleground in what pundits and 
scholars soon denounced as a ‘competition of victims’ and ‘memory wars’.15 While the 
political focus on this so-called ‘discourse of victimhood’ is problematic at best, it changed 
the way activists and other actors in the public sphere treated the role of memory in shaping 
France’s inter-community relations. The most notorious opening shot in this process was 
provided by what later became known as the ‘Dieudonné Affair’.
Dieudonné M’bala M’bala, a mixed-race Cameroonian-Breton comedian from the affluent 
Parisian suburb of Fontenay aux Roses, had become France’s most successful comedian and 
a poster boy for the French anti-racist Left by the early 2000. In 2002, however, he suddenly 
changed tack. After a TV sketch where the comedian appeared on stage dressed as an 
Orthodox Jew and saluted ‘Heil Israel’,16 he began a public trajectory based on anti-Semitic 
rants that made fun of the Holocaust. These included the claim that the HIV epidemic in 
Africa had been a Mossad plot and the definition of Holocaust remembrance as ‘memorial 
pornography’. More to the point, Dieudonné portrayed himself as a descendant of slaves, 
whose goal was to expose an ongoing historical battle between Jews and blacks in France, 
most particularly for primacy in a memorial war. Dieudonné claimed that ‘the Zionist power 
in France will stop at nothing in depriving a part of the population of its devoir de la 
mémoire’,17 adding ‘the Jewish lobby hates blacks […] As the black man, in the collective 
subconscious, embodies suffering, the Jewish lobby cannot stand him, because it’s their 
business’.18 This mix between ‘slaughtering holy cows’ and the focus on antisemitic 
conspiracy theories alienated him from mainstream press and the established Left at the same 
time as it helped increase his popularity as a self-proclaimed symbol of resistance. By 2010, 
Dieudonné had partnered up with Alain Soral, the far-right narcissist who focused on fighting 
the ‘Jewish enemy’.19 
In the immediate context of the early 2000s, Dieudonné’s rants focused public attention on 
the growing movement to commemorate France’s responsibility for historical enslavement. 
As the press dedicated growing space to the memory of enslavement, like the Nouvel 
Observateur’s special issue on slavery on March 2005,20 it also addressed the connection 
between commemorating slavery and the Holocaust. The magazine’s examination of the 
history of slavery as a reaction to Dieudonné suggested that the comedian’s polemics did 
more to raise mainstream interest in this aspect of French history than political mobilisation – 
and successes – within Caribbean communities. Furthermore, Dieudonné did not appropriate 
the issue of slavery from the vantage point of Caribbean activists who used its memory to 
approach their historical belonging to France, but as a representative of a black France, who 
aimed to speak for the totality of its oppressed minorities against ‘Jewish conspiracies’. His 
growing support base, which at first included the popular comedian Jamel Debbouze who 
praised Dieudonné’s ‘balls to say what we think’,21 validated the notion of Dieudonné as a 
phenomenon of the ‘suburbs’. The simultaneous focus on resentment within the suburbs to a 
supposed ‘memorial primacy’ of the Holocaust fuelled an idea that Jews were in a 
competition for state recognition against the rest of France’s racialised minorities. This logic 
relied on the notion that earlier successes of Jewish activists and the burgeoning acceptance 
of the necessity to acknowledge the responsibility of the French state for the fate of its Jewish 
citizens during the Second World War did not open up new avenues of discussion about the 
role of the state in the enslavement of Africans. On the contrary, they represented a 
preference of the state for Jews as a privileged community and exposed an element of ‘two 
different yardsticks’ towards France’s underprivileged black community.22
This notion of battle between the memory of the Holocaust and that of slavery intensified 
through the Pétré-Grenouilleau controversy. The historian Olivier Pétré-Grenouilleau held a 
post at the Université de Lorient when he published the work Les traites nérgières: Essai 
d’histoire globale in 2004. The book, which received several awards, examined the 
transatlantic, Arab and Inner African slave-trading routes from a purely economic 
perspective.23 In June 2005, however, in an interview to the Journal du Dimanche, Pétré-
Grenouilleau replied to a question about antisemitism in the black community following the 
Dieudonné Affair: 
That is […] the problem with the Taubira Law, which considers the 
enslavement of black people by Europeans as a ‘crime against humanity’, 
implicitly including a comparison with the Shoah. The Atlantic slave trade 
is not a genocide […] The Jewish genocide and the Atlantic slave trade are 
different processes. There is no Richter Scale for suffering.24
Shortly thereafter, the organisation Collectif des Antillais Guyanais-Réunionais filed a 
representative lawsuit against the historian for denying the Taubira Law’s characterisation of 
the Atlantic slave trade as a crime against humanity.25 Pétré-Grenouilleau found himself in 
the centre of a public controversy he had not anticipated, as the academic world quickly 
rallied behind to protest the lawsuit. Following these reactions, the Collectif DOM withdrew 
the lawsuit in 2006.26 However, the controversy left its mark on the debate, especially due to 
the aggression Pétré-Grenouilleau experienced from men and women who were offended by 
the interview. Various websites denounced Pétré-Grenouilleau as a racist and an ‘accomplice 
of slave traders’, or sent threats to his workplace.27 He received insults and threats on his 
doorstep.28 In a later interview with Libération, Pétré-Grenouilleau mainly expressed 
puzzlement at the unexpected virulence of the attacks, as ‘until the last few months, the 
history of the slave trade hardly interested anyone, at least in France’.29 This controversy 
validated the nascent image of a ‘memory war’ between minority communities that opposed 
two incompatible memories and pitted Jewish activists and members of other minority 
communities on different sides of the divide. When the Indigènes de la République emerged, 
they reacted to this context as the organisation quickly became a leading actor in any debate 
about the recognition of colonial history’s legacies in contemporary France.
The Indigènes de la République and the Colonial Republic 
The organisation Les Indigènes de la République was founded in 2005 by a group of activists 
of Maghrebi origin from the fringes of the French Left as a reaction to what the 
organisation’s founders perceived as the participation of anti-racism and the French left in the 
structures of the Republic. The three primary initiators of the project, the recent university 
graduate Houria Bouteldja, the pro-Palestinian activist Youssouf Boussoumah and the 
Tunisian former Trotskyist Sadri Khiari, met in 2003 through campaigning against the law 
that prohibited wearing ‘ostentatious symbols of religion in public spaces’, most notably in 
schools.  All three activists were dismayed by what they perceived as the implication of the 
‘do-gooding republican left’ in the racist undertones of the headscarf debate. The three began 
recruiting members in their activist networks, and in January 2005 published their manifesto, 
which has since become well known for its call to ‘decolonise the Republic’.30
In their critique of republican anti-racism, the group lumped together diverse organisations 
that had emerged in different moments and that had different strategies. These included 
established organisations such as the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme (LDH) or the Mouvement 
contre le racisme et pour l’amitié entre les peuples (MRAP), but also newer arrivals such as 
the Mouvement des immigrations et banlieues (MIB). These organisations all had different 
structures and forms of mobilisation, but all sought to build influence through campaigns and 
lobbying to influence government and local policy. In so doing, not only were they 
‘institutionalised’ and therefore relied on cooperation with the state, but they adopted a 
republican discourse, in which the goal of anti-racism was to assert the value of ‘colour-
blind’ French citizenship for all regardless of their origin.31 In this vein, these organisations 
prioritised fighting expressions of racism in France over the discussion of race and its 
influence on republican structures. On the level of discourse, anti-racism therefore promoted 
the idea of cross-community cooperation while resisting the assertion of group particularisms 
to avoid the charge of communautarisme. The Indigènes’ founders particularly resented the 
organisation SOS-racisme, which was founded in the 1980s and used high profile events and 
campaigns to promote a ‘feel-good’ anti-racism that focused on multi-ethnic cohesion. The 
new organisation’s arrival was an attempt to challenge the image of anti-racism as ‘inclusive’ 
and create an actor to represent the ‘indigenised’ postcolonial minorities in France.32 The 
Indigènes did not seek to emulate the methods and strategies of French anti-racism, but to 
establish their presence as a corrective. However, the exact goals of this corrective, in the 
same vein as the meaning of the organisation’s call to ‘decolonise the republic’, remained 
vague at best. 
The moment in which the Indigènes appeared was propitious for a new voice that mobilised 
colonial history to make sense of contemporary racism. As 2005 unfolded, debates about 
France’s colonial legacy mushroomed as the public engaged with Dieudonné, the 23 
February Law’s fourth article on the positive role of French colonialism and the October riots 
in the suburbs.33 While the Indigènes did not lead any of these debates, in fact in November 
2005 the quick development of the riots outpaced their capacity for engagement, the 
mainstream media kept referring to them in the role of token agitators.34 Many on the 
conservative right as well as on the anti-racist left continuously denounced them as dangerous 
communautaristes out to sabotage Republican cohesion and lead to the creation of American-
style racial particularisms, therefore keeping them an audible voice beyond their actual 
activist capacity. Indeed, their impact on the ground has been minimal.35 In the heyday of 
Indigène mobilisation, in 2008, they may have had just about a few hundred active members. 
This number has since decreased to a few dozen.36 The organisation therefore lacked the 
manpower or the skills to organise its ‘base’ like other traditional anti-racist organisations. 
Unlike more professionalised organisations like the MIB, it did not create structures on the 
ground to mobilise followers in specific campaigns, which has always made it difficult to 
comment on their ‘activist’ strategies. On the other hand, their visibility – through attention 
from others that was fuelled through their own media strategy – has given them 
disproportionate influence on the public discourse.
This quickly became the essence of a new kind of activism: rather than focusing on the 
specific demands of traditional anti-racist issues like housing or workplace discrimination, 
the organisation produced academic postcolonial analysis of ‘colonial continuities’ to explain 
France’s contemporary malaise. The foregrounding of colonial history in explaining 
republican racism enabled the Indigènes to bypass – and criticise – republican so-called 
colour blindness and address race as the main factor in contemporary French society. The 
novelty of this open thematisation of race, coupled with references to colonial imagery, 
assured the Indigenes’ exposure. Subsequently, an organisation that would have otherwise 
remained on the margins of France’s fragmented anti-racist scene was catapulted into the 
public eye through front-page coverage. In so doing, the organisation not only succeeded in 
injecting new ideas into the public conversation and keeping its voice heard in both 
mainstream and activist media, but also in establishing itself as an intellectual mouthpiece of 
a decolonial movement. This reflected one of the main contradictions in the organisation’s 
trajectory. On the one hand, the Indigènes constantly repeated their commitment to a base of 
racialised and underprivileged postcolonial minorities. On the other, Jérémy Robine’s initial 
characterisation of the organisation as a ‘bac plus cinq’ club37 conveyed a wide-ranging 
dismissal of the Indigènes as elitist academics, whose postcolonial analysis had little 
significance for the base they aimed to represent. Notwithstanding, this contradiction has 
enabled the organisation to survive in the public eye for over a decade as an actor who 
claimed to represent the French equivalent of Black Power (or Maghrebi Power) in the public 
sphere, often as what Houria Bouteldja called the articulate ‘token Arabs’38 in the media.  
This achievement owed much to Houria Bouteldja’s visible position in the forefront of the 
organisation. Out of the three initial main founders, the previously unpoliticised Bouteldja 
quickly became not only the main organisational power behind the organisation, but also its 
face in the media. From the very beginning, her interventions combined intellectual 
postcolonial analysis with a particularly colloquial style and targeted provocations. Her first 
foray into the waters of decolonial politics occurred after meeting Sadri Khiari in 2003, who 
encouraged her to analyse the headscarf debate through continuities of colonial paternalism 
that instrumentalised and sexualised Arab women in contemporary society. Bouteldja intoned 
that contemporary republican discourse emulated colonial images of Arab men as ‘violeurs, 
voleurs et voileurs’ (rapists, thieves and veilers of women) and called on activists to adopt a 
‘decolonial feminism’ that would express solidarity with racialised men against the interests 
of white feminism.39 This first analysis laid the groundwork for Bouteldja’s style of activism 
thereafter. On the one hand, she mobilised colonial imageries to make sense of the present, 
prioritise racial critique over other avenues, and defend racialised minorities against any 
critique from the ‘white establishment’. She articulated her position through a vocabulary that 
showed awareness of anglophone discussions of intersectionality, and with it her own 
position as a racialised woman.40 Furthermore, the particular style of her interventions, which 
combined lengthy think-pieces and provocative media appearances, later came to define the 
image of the Indigènes in the public eye. In both her writing and in person, she oscillated 
between academic precision and crudely colloquial formulations. These included the terms 
‘blanchité’ (best translated as ‘whitishness’) or ‘souchiens’ (original French), which 
transposed anglophone academic preoccupations with race into a colloquially raw French 
register. Another of her successful inventions was the harnessing of the term ‘indigènes’, 
which not only raised interest, but also conveyed the organisation’s preoccupation with 
colonial continuities and the representation of the suburbs in contemporary France. 
Bouteldja’s use of colloquialisms to theorise France’s postcolonial predicament not only 
helped her to a wider audience, but also reflected an attempt to square the circle between 
intellectual discourse and appeal to the ‘base’. In so doing, she was able to claim (publicly at 
the very least) that she was not a member of the white intellectual establishment, but that her 
language reflected her personal experience as a ‘victim of white oppression.’41 This language 
was one component of Bouteldja’s claim that the Indigènes’ strategy was to address only 
issues that ‘mattered’ to its base, which she identified as solidarity with Palestine, state 
racism and police crime.42
As an organisation that sought to represent the minorities of the suburbs in a debate about 
France’s colonial history, the media perceived the Indigènes as an actor in the nascent 
‘memory wars’. This was not just the effect of media coverage, as the relation to Jews and 
antisemitism engaged the organisation from the very beginning. For once, the debate about 
antisemitism and its place in the suburbs was one of the main catalysts for the organisation’s 
foundation. If the founding members of the Indigènes met through mobilisation against the 
headscarf law in 2003, the one event that Bouteldja later called the ‘last straw’43 that 
demonstrated the necessity of a new anti-racist organisation that required a ‘qualitative leap 
of anti-racism’,44 was the ‘RER-D affair’ in July 2004: Marie, a young woman had reported 
being attacked in the RER by a group of teenagers of Maghrebi origin, who had called her a 
filthy Jew, pushed over her pram with her baby inside, cut her hair and painted swastikas over 
her cheeks and belly with a glow-marker. The mainstream media was outraged and the entire 
political elite was quick to condemn the crime, which Marie reported just after another case 
had illustrated the recent rise of antisemitism, and with it the sense of conflict, in the suburbs: 
a young Jew, Ilan Halimi, had been kidnapped, tortured and left to die by a gang who had 
targeted him because ‘a Jew is rich’.45 In Marie’s story, however, the facts did not add up and 
the young woman admitted she had concocted the story to get attention. Media coverage, on 
the other hand, did not change after this revelation. Both politicians and pundits kept on 
insisting that the public outrage had been justified because Marie’s story had been so 
believably ‘of its time’.46 This, however, only fuelled Bouteldja’s critique: the media not only 
portrayed young Maghrebi men as inherently violent to women, but also antisemitic. 
Countering this allegation became an ever-growing priority for Bouteldja.
To this end, however, the organisation encountered two initial barriers in speaking about 
antisemitism. Firstly, the Indigènes de la République’s uncompromising relationship with 
Zionism made it a target by many Jewish actors. The organisation claimed to be an anti-
Zionist voice that represented pro-Palestinian movements in France and perceived the State 
of Israel as a colonial evil and Israelis as targets for justified anti-colonial violence. While the 
organisation did organise less than a handful of individual anti-Zionist Jewish members, most 
notably the lawyer Laurent Lévy,47 and eventually gained the support of organisations such as 
the Union juive française pour la paix48, its interpretation of Palestinian solidarity made 
conversation with Jewish actors difficult. Here, the singling out of Israel as the enemy, 
together with calls on Jews to disown Zionism not only infuriated the largely pro-Israel 
French-Jewish representative organs, but also alienated Jewish voices that were otherwise 
critical of Israel, and exasperated Jewish men and women who were more concerned about 
French Jewishness rather than relations to Israel. As a result, the central position the 
Indigènes assigned to Palestinian solidarity meant that conversations about the organisation’s 
relationship to antisemitism – and to Jews – often began and ended with Israel. 
Secondly, Bouteldja claimed to represent the true voice of the ‘population of colonial 
origin’49 and refused any white criticism of these. Nonetheless, this position became less and 
less tenable as the Jewish-Arab relationship in France became more vocally conflictual50 and 
the phenomenon of antisemitism in the banlieues – and particularly the link between anti-
Zionism and antisemitism – came under closer scrutiny by the media. Bouteldja then invested 
more energy in squaring the circle on antisemitism, particularly as she was repeatedly 
confronted with the need to position the Indigènes’ anti-Zionism vis-à-vis the rise and rise of 
Dieudonné with its base. 
For Bouteldja and the Indigènes, Dieudonné was an unavoidable reference. His soaring 
popularity, particularly among jeunes de banlieues, attracted the press and drew attention to 
the growth of antisemitism amongst racialised minorities. Moreover, as he drew attention to 
the link between the history – and memory – of slavery and contemporary identities and 
racism, Dieudonné occupied the same spot as the Indigènes. For the media, the connection 
between the two was inevitable, as the first mainstream reactions to the Indigènes’ manifesto 
showed. While it was published in January 2005, the first attention to the organisation 
emerged in reaction to Dieudonné’s visit to Algeria at the end of February and his comments 
that ‘we [black citizens] do not have the same rights as Zionists. They, at school, it’s enough 
that a child gets called a dirty Jew for everyone to rise up. For me, Zionism is the Aids of 
Judaism’.51 As commentators rallied to denounce the comedian, they used the example of the 
Indigènes as the latest arrival of a ‘communautariste’ organisation that embodied the dangers 
of mobilising the memory of the past for the sake of ‘victimisation’.52
The subject of Dieudonné kept intruding into the Indigènes’ interactions with the media. 
Interviews always returned to the question of the Indigènes’ position as a kind of Litmus Test 
set to devise whether they truly rejected antisemitism. For interviewers, denouncing 
Dieudonné’s relentless focus on the Shoah and Jewish communities was a clear choice, yet 
Bouteldja often preferred to avoid the subject. Attacking Dieudonné would have alienated the 
Indigènes’ base and been perceived as allying with the ‘establishment’ against a voice of 
‘resistance’. Only when Dieudonné paired up with Soral and joined the ranks of the far-right 
did Bouteldja begin searching for ways to criticise his choices. Here, her answers were 
usually contradictory along the lines of: ‘I love Dieudonné; I love him just as the Indigènes 
[here: racialised minorities in France] love him. I love him because he did something 
important in terms of dignity, […] he refused to be a token domesticated negro. Even if he 
did not have the right political software in his head, he has an attitude of resistance’.53 In the 
same vein, she would then continue and suggest that antisemitism was a ‘European practice’ 
that Dieudonné, as a racialised man, could not fully adopt and therefore could not be accused 
of. Even though Bouteldja spoke of Dieudonné’s alliance with the far-right as dangerous, she 
could not bring herself to ‘succumb to white pressures’ and condemn what she perceived as 
the ‘act of dignity’ that Dieudonné represented.54 As Dieudonné forced Bouteldja to address 
antisemitism, she did so initially from the position of the defender of France’s racial 
minorities against white criticism. 
Speaking of Antisemitism after Dieudonné
The Dieudonné Affair left the Indigènes convinced that they had been unjustly treated by the 
Republican left due to their refusal to disown him as a symbol of resistance.55 As a result, 
they increasingly focused on Jews and antisemitism in their interventions. These mostly 
appropriated anti-Zionism positively while claiming that the increased focus on left-wing 
antisemitism was a Zionist smear and a distraction from the real issue of French complicity in 
the Israeli occupation of Palestine.56 In so doing, they followed a generally well-trodden path, 
in which commentators often tried to completely separate anti-Zionism – as an anti-racist and 
anti-imperial concept – from antisemitism, as a form of European racism.57 Houria Bouteldja, 
however, saw the Dieudonné affair through the lens of colonial continuities. For her, the 
left’s focus on Dieudonné was a neo-colonial attempt to drive a wedge between French 
mainly North African Jewish community and France’s population issue de la colonisation, 
who, through their common origins, would otherwise have been natural partners for the 
Indigènes’ project of decolonial liberation. Bouteldja believed, however, that Jewish refusal 
to acknowledge this only demonstrated acquiescence to French Republican manipulation 
through a form of what she began to call a ‘state philosemitism’ in diverse texts and media 
appearances.58 This state philosemitism was supposedly demonstrated through the French 
state’s embrace of the ‘Jewish narrative’ through acknowledgement of the importance of the 
Holocaust in French public space through commemoration. For Bouteldja, this was a ploy to 
convince Jews that they had a stake in France’s Republican illusion, which became acutely 
visible with the success of Eric Zemmour’s essay Le suicide français (The French Suicide) in 
2014. 
Zemmour, born in Montreuil to Jewish-Algerian parents, had made a name for himself as a 
conservative journalist and provocateur and established a reputation for lambasting defenders 
of progressive causes such as immigration, women and LGBTQ issues.59 By the early 2010s, 
he landed in several judicial battles with anti-racist organisations – including the LICRA and 
the Union des étudiants juifs de France – and had gravitated ever closer to the Front 
national. The publication of The French Suicide demonstrated Zemmour’s rapprochement to 
the far-right, as the essay addressed a perceived decline of France since 1968 and included a 
whole section that tried to rehabilitate the image of Vichy. The book argued that the French 
state had been weakened through ‘derision, deconstruction and destruction’ and most notably 
through the ‘feminisation’ and the ‘halalisation’ of the state.60 As Le Monde’s Nicolas Truong 
did not fail to notice, these five hundred pages represented quite a usual lamentation on the 
‘decline […] of the dominant white male’.61 Nonetheless, as a growing number of 
unfavourable reviews criticised Zemmour’s clear swing to the far-right, sales soared to make 
the book the most commercially successful publication of the year.62 For Houria Bouteldja, 
Zemmour incarnated most of all the danger of Jewish faith in Republican assimilationism. 
For her, the main problem with Zemmour was not that he was a successful journalist who had 
published a successful far-right pamphlet, but that he was a Sephardic Jew who had 
succumbed to the temptation of believing that he had acquired enough privilege to disown his 
own Arab past. 
In an interview, Bouteldja kept returning to Zemmour’s trajectory as a representative sign of 
the ‘danger’ of Jewish belief in their ‘blanchité’.63 Just a few months before, she had 
expressed this same sentiment, and the guiding principles of the indigènes’ new position on 
antisemitism, in an open letter addressed to ‘Eric Zemmour, the Israelite’.64 This attack on 
Zemmour assumed a personal, irreverent tone to demonstrate Bouteldja’s connection to the 
population of the suburbs whose voice she wished to channel. This was in opposition to 
Zemmour, who, through his attempts to flatter the Republican conscience, had forgotten his 
‘real’ position as a racialised subject in French society. Bouteldja personalised this analysis 
further, as she assured that she did not ‘blame’ Zemmour for his ‘assimilationism’ due to the 
‘virulence of antisemitism’. Rather, she concluded that his Islamophobia was but a projection 
of his own sense of shame and resentmentat the ‘resistance’ that Muslim immigrants 
represent: 
You resent us for resisting the assimilationism that the Republic subjects us 
to while you and your family have succumbed to it […]. Our headscarves, 
our ostentatious beards, our mosques, our halal meats remind you too much 
of the identitary sacrifice which you needed to subject yourself to. […] Like 
every other mercenary, you have always led the crusades against us.65 
Importantly, Bouteldja approached Zemmour not only as a Jew, but specifically as an 
Algerian Jew, as ‘to make everything worse, not only are you Jewish, but also Arab (or 
Berber, but that’s the same) […] you did not even have the luck of being born Aryan!’66 In 
this context, Bouteldja’s personal focus on Zemmour – unlike for example Alain 
Finkielkraut, whom she treated as a ‘reactionary’ political opponent67 – resulted from a 
perception of France’s Sephardic Jewish community as fellow postcolonial subjects and 
therefore actors in the Indigènes’ ‘decolonial project’. While Ashkenazi Jews, whom she 
qualified as Zemmour’s ‘cousins’, were a part of a European story, Sephardic Jews were a 
part of colonial continuities that formed the core of Bouteldja’s analysis of contemporary 
France. As a result, the Indigènes’ spokesperson became increasingly preoccupied with the 
relationship between France’s Jews and its other postcolonial minorities. Her articulation of 
this relationship did not reflect a desire to work with existing actors to assuage tensions 
between Jewish and Maghrebi communities in France, but to present a blueprint for the 
refashioning of racialised society in 21st-century France. In 2016, Bouteldja articulated her 
ideas in a small booklet called Les Blancs, les Juifs et nous: Vers une politique de l’amour 
révolutionnaire.68 The book was structured as a lengthy - and often confused - manifesto, 
written in the first person. Like most of her work, the tone was provocative, oscillating 
between intellectual references and colloquialisms. In the book’s opening, Bouteldja 
introduced her argument as a personal one. She wrote as a ‘victim of white oppression’ to 
address the rise of fascism in a changing world. Her answer was a call for ‘peace and 
revolutionary love’ that would unite France’s Jews and other minorities as a ‘decolonial we 
of immigration’.69 
Bouteldja identified an alliance between Jews and the French state as the main problem of 
France’s postcolonial malaise. This supposed alliance was embodied through the French 
state’s increased embrace of the commemoration of the Holocaust. For Bouteldja, however, 
the Shoah was but a double distraction from the real issue. Firstly, she qualified the 
Holocaust as a ‘non-issue’ for citizens of the ‘global south’, including herself and France’s 
postcolonial immigrants. Here, she praised the example of Jean Genet, who ‘couldn’t give a 
damn about Hitler.’70 Secondly, citing Césaire, she claimed that the main problem with the 
Holocaust was its claim for uniqueness, while it was but ‘colonial methods’ used on a white 
population. In France, she continued, the focus on Jewish suffering not only diverted 
attention away from plight of colonial minorities, but made Jews believe they were accepted 
into the Republican state narrative.71 Jewish forgetting of their previous status of ‘not quite 
white’, she insisted, was the main barrier separating France’s Jewish and Arab populations 
and facilitated the creation of a neo-colonial image of Arabs as inherently anti-Semitic. Jews, 
she claimed, were a community simultaneously marked by a history of resistance to the 
violence of Republican assimilationism as ‘wandering Jews’ and a present of caving in to the 
temptations of Republicanism and Zionism. At the core, however, she contended that ‘to me 
you are simultaneously familiar and foreign. Familiar because you are insoluble non-whites 
in the anti-Semitic blanchité, but foreign because whitened, integrated into the superior 
echelon of racial hierarchy.’72 
Simultaneously, Bouteldja’s focus on the racial aspect of Jewish belonging in France 
perpetuated the logic of the so-called ‘memory wars’, re-articulating contemporary social 
conflicts through the vocabulary of history and memory. This historical logic explains 
Bouteldja’s choice to address only Sephardic Jews as actors in the same colonial continuities 
that underlie the Indigènes’ reading of race in contemporary France. While her letter to 
Zemmour stressed Republican complicity in the ‘Vichyite parenthesis,’73 Les blancs, les juifs 
et nous portrays Jews as postcolonial subjects. Here, the supposed Republican embrace of 
Holocaust remembrance had created a Republican Jewish identity that transcended 
Ashkenazi-Sephardic lines, but simultaneously, just like the Crémieux Decree, made 
Sephardic Jews believe they were beyond hierarchies of colonial rule and its legacies. 
Succumbing to the Republican temptation, she added (or, as she believes, to the illusion that 
Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews shared the same history74), was in fact an illusion that Jews 
received special treatment, while ‘actually, yes, you have been chosen, by the West. To […] 
solve the crisis of the white world’s moral legitimacy […] and subcontract Republican 
racism’.75 This, she continued, made them forget that ‘antisemitism is European. It is a 
product of modernity,’76 and that accordingly, by definition, immigrants issus de la 
colonisation cannot be anti-Semitic. 
In this context, Bouteldja suggested that the solution to the conflict was peace on ‘decolonial’ 
terms that would serve as a bulwark against the rise of the far-right.77 While a main bulk of 
her argument of what ‘decolonial’ meant focused on a call on French Jews to disown 
Zionism, which Bouteldja had often formulated before, the novelty of her argument consisted 
in the role of Jewish racialisation in the relationship between Jews and other minorities. This 
status as a racialised minority despite itself led to the declaration that ‘between us, everything 
remains possible’.78 This ‘everything’, or the offer of ‘peace’, relied on Bouteldja’s reading 
of France’s history along the lines of colonial continuities. Her ideal was to create a pact of 
‘decolonised minorities’ against Western domination: ‘you are still in the ghetto. But what if 
we left it together?’79 This, however, would only be based on Jewish renunciation of the 
memory of the Holocaust as a unique event and disowning their connection to Israel. 
Many on the Left and Right alike criticised the book as yet another provocation by the 
heavily mediatised Indigènes. ‘Bouteldja’s world is simple’,80 began Serge Halimi in Le 
Monde diplomatique, and expressed the overriding sentiment of critiques who deplored 
Bouteldja’s ‘amalgamation’ and simplification of antisemitism. On the one hand, this reflects 
a common knee-jerk reaction of many male commentators who began by discrediting 
Bouteldja’s thinking as ‘simplistic’ and ‘unserious’. Simultaneously, while many critics 
sought to uncover the fallacies and inconsistencies in Bouteldja’s text,81 their focus often 
returned to Bouteldja’s ‘divisive’ ‘identitarian excess’82 that prioritises the focus on race to 
strengthen ‘those who defy daily the spirit of enlightenment.’83 These reactions repeated the 
usual accusations, claiming that Bouteldja was fuelling racism and antisemitism – and 
generally contributing to the general atmosphere of social conflict – through her use of 
references to the past. On the other hand, after the journalist Jean Birnbaum blamed 
decolonial anti-racism’s ‘militant use of notions like “race”’84 for a malaise within the French 
Left, a group of twenty intellectuals published a manifesto in defence of Houria Bouteldja as 
a courageous thinker who dared to raise the issue of race in France.85 This reflected the 
circular state of the debate over the so-called ‘memory wars’, in which conflicts between 
different minority groups were often reduced to the issue of the legitimacy of ‘race’ in the 
Republican sphere. Nonetheless, the Indigènes’ increased engagement with the issue of 
antisemitism and the ways to approach French Jews demonstrated the contradictions inherent 
to the intersection of race and memory in the French discourse as well as to their position as 
an organisation that aimed to represent the voice of minorities in France’s public space. 
Conclusion
The Indigènes’ trajectory on antisemitism provides a privileged insight into the logic of 
‘memory wars’ over a decade after the coining of the expression. When Bouteldja jokingly 
mentioned the Indigènes had become the ‘token Arab’ of the do-gooding French Left,86 she 
was referring to the organisation’s position in the public eye as the leading actor in the debate 
on colonial memory. Yet here again, the vocabulary of memory and interpretation of the past 
were mainly a tool that enabled Bouteldja to address contemporary issues in France. While 
the term ‘memory wars’ meant nothing to Bouteldja, who would have dismissed it outright, 
she was aware of its context and knew her interventions affected the already toxic context in 
which different actors contrasted Holocaust remembrance with coming to terms with the 
France’s colonial crimes. 
The Indigènes and Bouteldja were torn between their goal to represent the population issue 
de la colonisation and outside pressures to tackle the issue of antisemitism in this very 
constituency, particularly after Mohammed Merah’s shooting on the Jewish school in 
Toulouse in 2012 and the Hyper-cacher attack in Paris in 2015. For the Indigènes, this 
conflict was particularly acute, as they had based their criticism of the Republic on the 
denunciation of racial and colonial hierarchies in France. And yet, hierarchies lost their clear 
contours in a climate where violence against Jews by mainly Maghrebi peers was becoming a 
reality that was difficult to ignore, while the relative privilege of a large part of France’s 
Jewish community separated it from many Maghrebi peers once again. Bouteldja used 
references to colonial history to square this circle and restore ‘clarity’ to her analysis of 
France’s postcolonial society. While she acknowledged the growing conflict between Jews 
and other minorities, she brandished antisemitism as a ‘European’ phenomenon and therefore 
intrinsically foreign to the population issue de la colonisation. 
In the same vein, Bouteldja not only used the colonial template to speak of the issue of 
antisemitism in the suburbs, but also to articulate the future of the relationship between Jews 
and postcolonial minorities, and particularly Arabs, in France. In other words, if the conflict 
between Jews and Arabs in France can be articulated in colonial terms, so should its solution. 
Decolonial peace, however, remained characteristic of another one of the Indigiènes’ 
contradictions, as the organisation often struggled to reconcile theory with lived experiences. 
In this case, even as Houria Bouteldja spoke of Jews, she kept referring to them as a near-
mythical group defined by abstract notions rather than a real, diverse community. She rarely 
engaged with living Jews, and mainly addressed individuals like Eric Zemmour or Alain 
Finkielkraut. She used them as examples of the regressive streak of ‘Zionist’ politics in 
France and thus a demonstration of the danger of Jewish acceptance of Republican 
universalism. The question here is not whether the lack of engagement with the real 
experiences of Jews was ‘antisemitic’, as some of Bouteldja’s critics claimed, but to what 
extent the direct borrowing of academic theories of intersectionality helps the cause of anti-
racism. On the level of academic analysis, Bouteldja’s analysis emerged from a logic of 
resistance to Republican structures and followed a coherent theoretical path. However, it 
struggled to reconcile the complexities of experiences in 21st-century France, where notions 
of belonging and conflict had developed and could no longer be explained solely through 
notions of historical – and colonial – continuities. The question remains how anti-racist 
activism can bridge the gap between Bouteldja’s analyses and mobilisation on the ground, or 
between the resistance of discourse and change on the terrain. 
Beyond the many contradictions of Bouteldja’s analysis, the focus on the Indigènes’ attention 
to antisemitism and relationship with France’s Jewish community address the very position of 
ethno-religious communities in France. Despite Bouteldja’s lack on attention to Jewish lived 
experiences, her engagement with antisemitism is a reminder that the role of France’s Jewish 
community – as a minority that struggles between racialisation and acceptance – is pivotal for 
the understanding of the articulation of race and whiteness in the fifth republic. Examining 
this contradictory Jewish position shifts the focus from Maud Mendel and Ethan Katz’s 
works on Jewish-Muslim relations in France as between two religious communities.87 It 
suggests that to understand changes in the Fifth Republic, more attention needs to be given to 
questions of Jewish racialisation – and with it to more diverse and contemporary Jewish 
voices – and its significance for the articulation of ‘race’ in 21st-century France. 
In other words, just in the same way as the Indigènes’ embrace of the vocabulary of memory 
presented a way to approach race in the 21st-century French republican landscape, 
Bouteldja’s interventions about Jews and antisemitism raise an issue that is otherwise 
difficult to broach, namely that of Jewish racialisation in Europe. Despite broad 
generalisations and simplifications, Bouteldja addressed the position of French Jews as a 
community that shares a history of racialisation at the same time as it considers itself fully 
accepted into France’s republican establishment. This fragile position relies on the 
articulation of contemporary Jewish – cultural and ethnic rather than religious – identities as 
inherently French. As the concept and vocabulary of ‘whiteness’ begin to appear ever more 
often in the French and broader European circumstance, this Jewish position on the margins 
of whiteness should receive broader scholarly attention. Questions about the role of memory 
and race in the articulation of modern Jewish identities can be raised with greater focus on the 
actions and words of Jewish actors from different sides of the cultural, religious and political 
spectrum. 
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